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課程名稱 |
路易斯哲學
The Philosophy of David Lewis |
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開課學期 |
103-1 |
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授課對象 |
文學院 哲學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
鄧敦民 |
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課號 |
Phl7767 |
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課程識別碼 |
124EM7430 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
3 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期四3,4,@(10:20~) |
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上課地點 |
哲研討室一 |
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備註 |
本課程以英語授課。D斷代。E領域。
總人數上限：15人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1031lewis |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
路易斯在許多英美分析哲學的領域中，皆有十分重要的影響力，包含形上學、邏輯哲學、語言哲學、心靈哲學、科學哲學、知識論等。他的主要著作包含了四本書、五本論文集，以及許多的期刊論文。他是發展模態邏輯的主要人物之一，並以「可能世界是具體的」與「副本論」著稱。他同時也是條件句邏輯的創始人之一，透過相似性的概念建構了一套虛擬條件句的語意學。此外，他對因果概念的虛擬條件句分析，以及所發展出來的休姆式計畫，還有在決定理論當中他所發展的「因果式的理論」等等，都說明了路易斯為領導許多重要哲學發展的主要人物。
路易斯開創了一個新的哲學風格：所謂的「概念分析」。對路易斯而言，哲學家最主要的工作，就是在為核心重要的哲學概念給出適當的分析。他廣泛的使用這樣的哲學進路來分析「可能性」、「機率」、「內在性質」、「自然律則」、「因果」、「時間的方向」等概念。
在本課程中，我們會研讀路易斯哲學的主要作品。前六週討論他的「虛擬條件句」以及「模態」等主要主題。接下來的課程中，參與的學生可以從建議的書單中選擇自己有興趣的議題來進行課堂報告與討論。底下列出一些路易斯哲學中處理到的主題(詳見參考書目)：
(A). Modality
(B). Causation & Time
(C). Properties
(D). Persistence & composition
(E). Dispositions
(F). Truth-makers
(G). Probabilities & decision theory
(H). Philosophy of mind
(I). Epistemology
(J). Philosophy of Science
(K). Philosophy of language
(L). Philosophical logic & mereology
(M). Philosophy of Religion
(N). Ethics
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課程目標 |
本課程目標在使學生能夠 (1) 理解路易斯哲學的主要主題，並且(2) 能對於所選的議題提出自己的見解。
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課程要求 |
Each week, a paper will be discussed in the class. Each student is required to introduce at least one paper during the course and present his own comments on it. But all students are required to read the assigned paper in advance. Students are required to submit a midterm essay (not more than 2000 words) and a final essay (not more than 4000 words). |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
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參考書目 |
Texts:
Books:
1. Lewis, D. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.
2. Lewis, D. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1973.
3. Lewis, D. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986.
4. Lewis, D. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
Collections:
1. Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers, volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
2. Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers, volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
3. Lewis, D. Papers in Philosophical Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
4. Lewis, D. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
5. Lewis, D. Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Recommended Secondary Literature:
1. Fine, K. ‘Critical Notice of Counterfactuals.’ Mind, 84: 451–458, 1975.
2. Nolan, D. David Lewis. Chesham: Acumen Publishing, 2005.
3. Jackson, F. and Priest, G. Lewisian Themes: the Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Suggested readings:
(A). Modality
1. Lewis, D. ‘Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.’ Journal of Philosophy, 65(5):113–126, 1968.
(B). Causation & Time
1. Lewis, D. ‘Causation.’ Journal of Philosophy, 70(17):556–567, 1973.
2. Lewis, D. ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel.’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 13(2):145–152, 1976.
3. Lewis, D. ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.’ Nous, 13(4):455–476, 1979.
4. Lewis, D. ‘Causation as Influence.’ In J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul, eds., Causation and Counterfactuals, pp. 75–106. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.
(C). Properties
1. Lewis, D. ‘Extrinsic Properties.’ Philosophical Studies, 44(2):197–200, 1983.
2. Lewis, D. ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61(4):343–377, 1983.
3. Lewis, D. ‘Putnam’s Paradox.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62(3):221–236, 1984.
4. Lewis, D. ‘Against Structural Universals.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64(1):25–46, 1986.
5. Lewis, D. ‘Redefining ‘Intrinsic’.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63(2):381–398, 2001.
(D). Persistence & composition
1. Lewis, D. ‘Survival and Identity.’ In A. O. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons, pp. 17–40. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe.’ Analysis, 48(1):65–72, 1988.
3. Lewis, D. ‘Many, But Almost One.’ In K. Campbell, J. Bacon, and L. Reinhardt, eds., Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong, pp. 23–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
(E). Dispositions
1. Lewis, D. ‘Finkish Dispositions.’ Philosophical Quarterly, 47(187):143–158, 1997.
(F). Truth-makers
1. Lewis, D. ‘Truthmaking and Difference-Making.’ Nous, 35(4):602–615, 2001.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Things qua Truthmakers.’ In H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, eds., Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, pp. 25–38. London: Routledge, 2003.
3. Lewis, D. and Rosen, G. ‘Postscript to ‘Things qua Truthmakers’: Negative Existentials.’ In H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, eds., Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, pp. 39–42. London: Routledge, 2003.
(G). Probabilities & Decision theory
1. Lewis, D. ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.’ Philosophical Review, 85(3):297–315, 1976.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma is a Newcomb Problem.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8(3):235–240, 1979.
3. Lewis, D. ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.’ In Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, volume 2, pp. 83–132. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
4. Lewis, D. ‘Causal Decision Theory.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59(1):5–30, 1981.
5. Lewis, D. ‘Desire as Belief.’ Mind, 97(387):323–32, 1988.
6. Lewis, D. ‘Desire as Belief II.’ Mind, 105(418):303–13, 1996.
(H). Philosophy of mind
1. Lewis, D. ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory.’ Journal of Philosophy, 63(2):17–25, 1966.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.’ Philosophical Review, 88(4):513–543, 1979.
3. Lewis, D. ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain.’ In N. Block, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, volume I, pp. 216–232. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
4. Lewis, D. ‘Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58(3):239–249, 1980.
5. Lewis, D. ‘What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 59(3):283–289, 1981.
6. Lewis, D. ‘Reduction of Mind.’ In S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, pp. 412–431. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
(I). Epistemology
1. Lewis, D. ‘Elusive Knowledge.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4):549–567, 1996.
(J). Philosophy of Science
1. Lewis, D. ‘How to Define Theoretical Terms.’ Journal of Philosophy, 67(13):427–446, 1970.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Ramseyan Humility.’ In D. Braddon-Mitchell and R. Nola, eds., Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, pp. 203–222. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009.
(K). Philosophy of language
1. Lewis, D. ‘General Semantics.’ Synthese, 22(1-2):18–67, 1970.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Radical Interpretation.’ Synthese, 27(3-4):331–344, 1974.
3. Lewis, D. ‘Adverbs of Quantification.’ In Formal Semantics of Natural Language, pp. 3–15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
4. Lewis, D. ‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game.’ Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1):339–359, 1979.
(L). Philosophical logic & mereology
1. Lewis, D. ‘Nominalistic Set Theory.’ Nous, 4(3):225–240, 1970.
2. Lewis, D. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
3. Lewis, D. ‘Mathematics is Megethology.’ Philosophia Mathematica, 3(1):3–23, 1993.
(M). Philosophy of Religion
1. Lewis, D. ‘Anselm and Actuality.’ Nous, 4(2):175–188, 1970.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Evil for Freedom’s Sake?’ Philosophical Papers, 22(3):149–172, 1993.
3. Lewis, D. ‘Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?’ Philosophical Papers, 26(3):203–209, 1997.
4. Lewis, D. ‘Divine Evil.’ In L. Anthony, ed., Philosophers Without Gods, pp. 231–242. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
(N). Ethics
1. Lewis, D. ‘Devil’s Bargains and the Real World.’ In D. Maclean, ed., The Security Gamble: Deterrence in the Nuclear Age, pp. 141–154. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, 1984.
2. Lewis, D. ‘Dispositional Theories of Value.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63:113–137, 1989.
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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Week 1 |
9/18 |
Introduction |
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Week 2 |
9/25 |
Counterfactuals I |
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Week 3 |
10/02 |
Counterfactuals II |
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Week 4 |
10/09 |
On the Plurality of Worlds I |
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Week 5 |
10/16 |
On the Plurality of Worlds II |
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Week 6 |
10/23 |
On the Plurality of Worlds III |
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Week 7 |
10/30 |
On the Plurality of Worlds IV |
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Week 8 |
11/06 |
Presentations |
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Week 9 |
11/13 |
Modality |
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Week 10 |
11/20 |
Persistence |
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Week 11 |
11/27 |
Theory of Probability |
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Week 12 |
12/04 |
Causation |
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Week 13 |
12/11 |
Philosophy of Science |
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Week 14 |
12/18 |
Intrinsic Properties |
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Week 15 |
12/25 |
Philosophy of Religion |
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Week 16 |
1/01 |
National Day |
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Week 17 |
1/08 |
Composition |
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